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Abstract
Empirical evidence demonstrates that the inclusion of improper statements by the
prosecutor during closing argument increases death penalty recommendations (Platania &
Moran, 1999). Judicial instructions to disregard improper statements have been found to
moderate this effect (Platania, Small, Fusco, Miller & Perrault, 2008). The present study
further explored the effectiveness of judicial instruction as a legal safeguard and
examined the role of individual differences in explaining individuals’ acceptance of
prosecutorial misconduct. One hundred and twenty four jury-eligible individuals viewed
a videotape based on the penalty phase of a capital trial (Brooks v. State, 1979). Results
revealed that attitudes toward the death penalty, instruction comprehension and mood
predict individuals’ acceptance of misconduct. Judicial instructions had limited
effectiveness as a legal safeguard.
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The Role of Individual Differences in Explaining
the Acceptability of Prosecutorial Misconduct
Prosecutorial misconduct occurs in numerous forms and has been identified as a
contributing factor in the wrongful conviction of innocent people (Schoenfield, 2005).
Misconduct is defined as any intentional use of illegal or improper methods to convict a
defendant in a criminal trial. Examples include suppressing evidence, using false or
perjured evidence, improperly questioning witnesses and referencing the defendant’s
failure to testify on his own behalf (Lucas, Graif, & Lovaglia, 2006; Time, 1974).
Prosecutorial misconduct has serious implications during the penalty phase of a trial.
Research indicates that individuals exposed to improper statements made by the
prosecution in closing arguments are significantly more likely to impose the death
penalty than those who are not (Platania & Moran, 1999). The prejudicial impact of
prosecutorial misconduct diverts jurors’ attention from the legally relevant facts and
compromises a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Thus, it is extremely important for courts
to distinguish prosecutorial misconduct from permissible arguments. In order to do this,
the true legal task of the sentencing phase of a capital trial needs to be clearly defined and
effectively communicated to the jury.
Guided Discretion
The bifurcated nature of capital cases requires jurors to complete two very distinct
tasks, highlighting the need for guided discretion to assist them in this process. In
bifurcated proceedings, a defendant’s guilt and punishment are determined separately: the
guilt phase focuses on legally relevant facts, while the penalty phase focuses on the
defendant’s character, history, and motivations. An attorney’s closing argument during
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sentencing is the final attempt to convince the jury that one punishment is more deserving
than another. In doing so, attorneys sometimes go beyond the evidence of the case to
trigger jurors’ attitudes and emotions about human nature, morality, and justice. Without
clearly defined rules for determining who deserves the death penalty and who does not,
jurors are influenced by such factors, resulting in an arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty (Costanzo & Costanzo, 1992).
The Supreme Court addressed this prejudicial imposition of the death penalty in
the landmark decision of Furman v. Georgia (1972). In Furman, the Court ruled the
death penalty to be unconstitutional as it was currently being administered and
established the need to develop guidelines to reduce bias in juror’s discretion. As a result
of Furman, states introduced new statutes to improve the standards for imposing the
death penalty. The first set of reformed death penalty statutes were decided in Gregg v.
Georgia (1976). In Gregg, the Court agreed that jurors be provided with a specific list of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances to consider when recommending a death
sentence. In 1978, the Supreme Court ruled that aggravating circumstances be limited by
statute (Lockett v. Ohio, 1978). Aggravating circumstances are determined by the state
and can be used as legitimate reasons to vote for death. The prosecutor must prove these
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and the jury must unanimously agree that they
exist (Butler & Moran, 2002). Mitigating circumstances are any circumstances
considered to be legitimate support for a life sentence. Mitigating factors may be proven
by a preponderance of the evidence and may be found by just one or more members of
the jury (Platania & Moran, 1999). Unfortunately, research indicates that the imposition
of the death penalty remains discriminatory despite the Court's attempt to reduce juror
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discretion (Costanzo & Costanzo, 1992). Research examining jurors' abilities to properly
weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances suggests that jurors often consider
extralegal factors beyond those introduced by law (Costanzo & Peterson, 1994).
Costanzo and Peterson (1994) found persuasive techniques used in closing
arguments seemed to revolve around a number of re-emerging themes, some of which
deviate considerably from aiding the jury in evaluating aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. These broad categories include: attorney’s beliefs and attitudes towards
the defendant, the defendant and his life, the murder, the victim, juror obligations, the
sentence, and morality and justice. Prosecutors often argue that mitigating circumstances
are feigned and insignificant, explain the crime in vivid detail and focus on the suffering
of the victims and their families. Prosecutors may also shift the burden of responsibility
for determining sentence from the juror to the law, arguing that life in prison is not
sufficient punishment and that revenge is morally legitimate (Costanzo & Peterson,
1994). Each is an attempt to improperly justify imposing the death penalty. Although
the facts of the case and the law limit the persuasive arguments that can be used during
closing argument, both the defense and prosecution have considerable latitude in
constructing their arguments. In their attempts to persuade the jury to vote for death,
prosecutors’ arguments combine a number of persuasive tactics, often with little
relevance to the law’s requirements of proving the existence of aggravating
circumstances.
Improper Penalty Phase Argument
Research has found that improper statements made by prosecutors include
arguments designed to influence jurors’ sentencing decisions (Platania & Moran, 1999).
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This type of misconduct is particularly problematic because in order to be considered
improper, an appellate court must conclude that a prosecutor’s statements violated the
defendant’s right to a fair trial. Although the Supreme Court has not yet established
specific guidelines for determining permissible prosecutorial argument, lower courts have
provided general guidelines for identifying improper argument. Statements have been
considered improper if they ask the jury to impose the death penalty for the following
reasons: cost (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976), trivializing the jury’s role (Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 1985), and using personal discretion and victim characteristics, to name a
few (Brooks v. Kemp, 1985). In reviewing cases of confirmed misconduct, other
categories of prosecutorial misconduct emerge such as: prosecutor’s personal beliefs and
opinions in support for the death penalty, mischaracterizing the jury’s role, using
improper grounds to impose the death penalty (e.g., quoting the bible), and the use of
inflammatory comments to describe the defendant (e.g., references to race). In general,
statements that increase the likelihood that extra-legal factors will be considered in
making a sentence determination are classified as improper prosecutor argument (Platania
et al., 2008).
Even if statements are by definition improper, appellate courts may rule the
statement insignificant to the outcome of the trial. For example, The Court of Criminal
Appeals has set forth four areas in which closing arguments by a prosecutor are proper.
If a prosecutor’s statements provide a summation of the evidence, a reasonable deduction
from the evidence, an answer to an argument presented by opposing counsel, or a plea for
law enforcement, they would not constitute error. If a statement falls outside these
categories however, it is still not sufficient grounds for a reversal of the sentencing
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outcome. It must also be demonstrated that statements were serious enough to strike
down the decision made at trial (Time, 1974). In Chapman v. California (1967), the
Supreme Court ruled that the prosecutor’s tactic of repeatedly referencing the defendant’s
failure to testify inferred his guilt and substantially influenced the jury to convict. In other
words, the prosecutor’s actions constituted “irreversible” rather than “harmless” error.
Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for higher courts to rule that prosecutorial
misconduct is harmless error. For example, in Brooks v. Kemp (1985), the Federal Court
of Appeals for the 11th Circuit refused to overturn a defendant’s death sentence despite
the existence of prosecutorial misconduct on the grounds that in the absence of the
statements, the defendant would still have received the death penalty. Considering that
exposure to prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument has been found to increase
the likelihood of imposing the death penalty, this harmless error rule is particularly
problematic (Platania & Moran, 1999).
Legal Safeguards
Although research has uncovered the biasing effect of improper statements, legal
safeguards are assumed to minimize the influence of improper arguments to harmless
error. The Supreme Court has indicated that arguments violating the parameters of
permissible argument should be objected to and clarified by specific judicial instruction
(Time, 1974). However, little research has investigated jurors’ responses to specific
curative instruction. Platania, et al. (2008) investigated the effectiveness of defense
attorney objections and judicial instructions as legal safeguards against prosecutorial
misconduct with three levels of instruction: no instruction vs. general instructions (based
on Weaver v. Bowersox, 2006) vs. specific instructions (based on Donnelly v.
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DeChristoforo, 1974). Results indicated that both general and specific misconduct
instructions had a moderating effect on perceptions of improper statements made during
closing argument, however no significant differences existed between the two types of
instruction. In other words, any type of instruction seemed to fare better than none at all.
Unfortunately, instructional safeguards must also overcome issues of
comprehensibility. Previous research indicates that jurors’ instruction comprehension is
often poor and can influence sentencing decisions in capital trials (Weiner, Pritchard &
Westin, 1995). Sentencing instructions should guide the jury to objectively weigh
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, preventing inconsistent imposition of the death
penalty. Specifically, this guided discretion should help the jury distinguish between
aggravating and mitigating factors and the decision rules of each. Research examining
juror comprehension of judges’ instructions in the penalty phase of capital trials indicates
that jurors’ understanding of mitigating decision rules is particularly inadequate
(Luginbuhl, 1992). Individual differences and attitudes that jurors bring to trial may in
turn limit their ability to understand and adhere to instructions. Researchers examining
the role of instruction comprehension and attitudes on sentence certainty have suggested
that instruction comprehension and support for the death penalty are interrelated in a
complex way that may be explained by motivational factors (Beringer, Weiner & Richter,
2008). If jurors do not understand sentencing instructions, they may be less motivated to
follow the instructions or more prone to use their own decision criteria, relying on
extralegal factors such as improper penalty phase argument. Thus, poor instruction
comprehension may mediate the effectiveness of judicial instructions as a legal safeguard
against prosecutorial misconduct.
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Juror Attitudes
Individual differences such as juror attitudes, may further mediate the degree to
which jurors consider prosecutorial misconduct in their sentencing decisions.
Determining which attitudes may be the strongest predictors of jury decision making has
been a difficult and rather unsuccessful endeavor for social science researchers (Kassin &
Wrightsman, 1983). However, research indicates that attitudes toward the death penalty
(Butler & Moran, 2007) and authoritarianism (Narby, Cutler & Moran, 1993) are
significant predictors of juror decision making in general. O’Neil, Patry, and Penrod
(2004) have indicated that attitudes toward the death penalty may influence sentencing
decisions in three ways: directly influencing sentencing verdicts, indirectly influencing
jurors’ identification of aggravating and mitigating factors, or through the interacting
influence of attitudes and the process of weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.
Most research examining the relation between attitudes toward the death penalty
and juror decision making have relied on death qualification status, assuming that death
qualified jurors support the death penalty more than excludable jurors (O’Neil et al.,
2004). Death qualification is the process by which potential jurors are dismissed from
service on capital juries if their attitudes toward the death penalty are so strong that they
would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as a juror”
(Wainwright v Witt, 1985, p. 424). Research has continued to indicate that death
qualified jurors are more conviction and death prone than excludable jurors (Butler &
Moran, 2007; Butler & Moran, 2002). However, O'Neil et al. (2004) surmise that there
are problems with using only death qualification status as an indicator of support for the
death penalty. The percentage of individuals who consider themselves excludable is
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considerably small; making it challenging to locate and adequately compare excludables
to death qualified individuals. In addition, the excludable category also includes the
small percentage of individuals whose favorable attitudes render them incapable of being
impartial. Attitudes toward the death penalty are thus better measured on a scale such as
the Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty (ATDP) Scale created by O’Neil et al. (2004)
which attempts to assess all potential reasoning guiding support of the death penalty.
In the sentencing phase of capital trials, attitudes toward the death penalty as
measured by the ATDP scale have been found to influence the identification of
aggravating and mitigating factors (Beringer et al., 2007; Butler & Moran, 2002) and to
have a direct, unmediated effect on sentencing verdict (O’Neil et al., 2004). Researchers
also suggest that individual differences in attitudes toward the death penalty may
decrease a jurors’ comprehension of sentencing instructions (Beringer et al., 2007).
These biasing effects of support for the death penalty are concerning, especially given
that the reasons cited for opposing or supporting the death penalty are often based on
emotion and ideological self-image rather than factual information (Ellsworth & Gross,
1994). Therefore, attitudes toward the death penalty are thought to have an affective
component, acting as a mediator in sentencing decisions. Research indicates that in
addition to juror attitudes, affect may be a mediator of verdict and judgment (Myers &
Greene, 2004; Forgas, 1995).
Affect
The stress of being a capital juror can play a particularly important role in
sentencing decisions. The guilt phase is considered to be a factual or evidence-based
task, while the penalty phase is considered a more difficult, emotional task (Costanzo &
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Costanzo, 1994). Prosecutors’ closing arguments that recount the most vivid details of
the crime can trigger juror emotion and heighten reactions to persuasive statements
(Costanzo & Peterson, 1994). In addition, the most frequently cited reason for imposing
a death sentence was the gruesome or cruel nature of the murder (Geimer & Amsterdam,
1998; as cited in Costanzo & Costanzo, 1992).
The notion that emotional statements can lead to emotional judgments is
demonstrated in research examining the effect of victim impact statements on sentencing
verdicts. Victim impact statements (VIS) are extremely emotion-laden and have been
found to significantly increase jurors’ decisions to sentence the defendant to death (Myers
& Greene, 2004; Platania & Berman, 2006). Furthermore, attitudes toward the death
penalty have been found to mediate this effect. Individuals who have neutral or
moderately favorable attitudes toward the death penalty were even more likely to vote for
death in the presence of victim impact statements (Myers & Greene, 2004). Affect may
also play a similar role in mediating the biasing effect of improper penalty phase
argument. Jurors’ acceptability of prosecutorial misconduct may be influenced by the
emotional reactions they induce, particularly if these arguments tap into jurors’ powerful
attitudes about the death penalty. However, the interacting effects of affect and attitudes
on sentencing verdicts remain relatively unstudied, particularly in the presence of
prosecutorial misconduct.
The Theory of Affect Infusion (AIM)
The Affect Infusion Model (AIM) proposed by Forgas (1995) may provide
valuable insight into the role of individual differences in predicting the acceptability of
prosecutorial misconduct and sentencing judgments. However, previous research on
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emotion and judgment suggests that not all judgments containing an emotional
component are irrational and biased (Myers & Greene, 2004). Some emotions may
promote rational decision making rather than inhibit it. Furthermore, individual juror
characteristics may mediate this complex relationship and result in a wide variety of
perceptions of emotionally-laden aspects of trial. Forgas’ (1995) notion of affect infusion
seeks to explain this complex relationship between affect and decision making. Affect
infusion is defined as “the process whereby affectively loaded information exerts an
influence on and becomes incorporated into the judgmental process, entering into the
judge's deliberations and eventually coloring the judgmental outcome” (Forgas, 1995, p.
39). The AIM is a multi-process approach to understanding social judgments which
attempts to account for those instances in which affect seemingly has little influence, as
well as those in which affect unduly influences an individual’s judgment. This model
may be particularly helpful in conceptualizing individual differences in responses to
prosecutorial misconduct and instructional safeguards.
Forgas’ (1995) affect infusion model is based on the premise that the nature and
degree to which mood influences judgments largely depends on what kind of processing
strategy the individual is engaged in (known as process mediation) and the notion that
individuals will adopt the simplest and least effortful processing strategy possible (known
as effort minimization). According to the AIM, there are four information processing
strategies: direct access strategy, motivated strategy, heuristic strategy, and substantive
strategy. The direct access strategy is the simple retrieval of previously stored
information that is typically used in highly familiar tasks. This method is a low affect
infusion strategy as the information necessary to make the judgment is readily available
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and there are no strong forces demanding a more elaborate form of processing (Forgas,
1995). Given that a juror's task in the penalty phase is highly unfamiliar, capital jurors
are not likely to engage in this processing strategy in their sentencing decisions.
Forgas’ (1995) second strategy is termed motivated processing and involves
highly selective, guided and targeted information searches in which preferences are most
likely to guide one's inferences. This is also a low affect infusion strategy because the
search pattern and judgment outcome are guided by a previous motivational goal, only
subtly influenced by mood. This strategy may be more common among capital jurors
who have strongly held personal beliefs that may guide their decision making. However,
attitudes with a strong affective component such as attitudes toward the death penalty
may decrease the motivated processing. Thus according to the AIM, jurors may be more
likely to engage in high affect infusion information processing strategies when judging a
defendant’s appropriate punishment compared to low affect strategies.
The heuristic processing may be more representative of the type of processing
used by capital jurors in the penalty phase. According to the AIM, individuals with no
prior experience with the task and no strong motivational goal to determine the outcome
are likely to utilize this strategy by considering only some of the available information
and using whatever heuristic shortcuts are available (Forgas, 1995). In the penalty phase
of a capital trial, these heuristics may include previously held attitudes toward the death
penalty, statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument, or misconceptions
of the sentencing phase task. Many capital jurors have admitted that they did not feel the
sentencing phase was necessary to render a fair punishment after listening to the guilt
phase of the trial (Costanzo & Costanzo, 1992). Individuals utilizing this processing
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strategy may be more likely to disregard judicial instruction or be less motivated to
adhere to instructions if they are making judgments based on heuristic shortcuts and are
incorporating their affective reactions into their sentencing decisions.
The final strategy of substantive processing is also a high affect infusion model
and may explain how affect may interact with individual differences to influence
sentencing decisions and the acceptance of prosecutorial misconduct. According to
Forgas (1995), this strategy is more likely to occur when “the target is complex or
atypical and the judge has no specific motivation to pursue, has adequate cognitive
capacity and is motivated to be accurate, possibly because of explicit or implicit
situational demands” (p. 47). The atypical nature of the sentencing task, along with poor
instruction comprehension, emotionally-laden and improper closing arguments, and
strong attitudes toward the death penalty have the potential to influence the degree to
which emotions color jurors' judgments. Due to its complex nature, this form of
processing depends on the nature of the individual's memory and is hypothesized to be
the default option, utilized only when simpler and less effortful strategies are inadequate
(Forgas, 2004). The perceived difficulty of the penalty phase task (Costanzo & Costanzo,
1992) and jurors’ demonstrated difficulty understanding and adhering to penalty phase
instructions (Luginbuhl, 1992) suggest that jurors may be forced to adopt more
comprehensive information processing strategies.
In summary, the Affect Infusion Model suggests that as the task becomes less
familiar, more complex and more demanding, affect is more likely to color a juror's
rational decision making capacity. Applied to jury decision making in the penalty phase
of a capital trial, Affect Infusion Theory suggests that the nature of the task itself, the
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individual juror, and situational variables all interact to determine whether affect will
mediate juror decision making. The complex nature of the sentencing task itself suggests
that jurors’ judgments regarding the deservingness of the death penalty will be moodcongruent. However, individual differences such as attitudes toward the death penalty
may influence the degree to which jurors make emotional judgments. The current study
seeks to explore whether affect in fact predicts jurors’ evaluations of aggravating and
mitigating factors, responses to prosecutorial misconduct and sentencing decisions.
Purpose and Hypothesis
The current study is based on the 1977 trial of William Anthony Brooks. In this
case, Brooks was convicted of the armed robbery, rape, kidnapping, and murder of Carol
Jeanine Galloway for which he was sentenced to death. Upon appeal, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, ruling the prosecutorial misconduct
present in the sentencing phase as harmless error. Due to the strength of the evidence, the
Court ruled that the penalty phase was not prejudiced despite the existence of improper
remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument (Brooks v. Kemp, 1985).
Although Brooks’ appeal was granted on an instruction issue, it is most noted for the
prosecutor’s use of improper comments in his closing argument. Previous research
utilizing this stimulus case revealed that individuals exposed to the improper arguments
are more death prone (Platania & Moran, 1999), and that judicial instructions regarding
the improper statements were effective in moderating the prejudicial impact of the
prosecutorial misconduct (Platania et al., 2008).
The primary aim of the current study was to explore whether and to what extent
individual differences established in voir dire predict the acceptability of prosecutorial
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misconduct and mediate the effectiveness of judicial instructions. We predicted that
attitudes toward the death penalty, instruction comprehension and juror affect will predict
individuals’ perceived acceptance of prosecutorial misconduct and would influence the
effectiveness of judicial instructions as a legal safeguard. The effectiveness of judicial
instructions against the negative impact of prosecutorial misconduct will be measured by
ratings of importance of the improper statements, evaluations of aggravating and
mitigating factors, and sentence outcome.
Consistent with previous research, we also predicted that judicial instructions will
moderate the degree of importance jurors’ attribute to improper statements made during
closing argument (Platania et al., 2008). Judicial instruction would also moderate the
impact of misconduct as measured by sentence outcome, and consideration of
aggravating and mitigating factors. Jurors exposed to instructions would be less likely to
consider improper statements in their sentencing decision, would be less likely to impose
the death penalty and be more likely to consider mitigating circumstances.
Method
Participants
One-hundred seventy-four total participants completed the study. Participants
consisted of 79 community members and 95 undergraduate students from Roger
Williams University. Undergraduate students were recruited from a subject pool of core
undergraduate courses. Community members were recruited via a printed advertisement
in the Eastbay Times or an internet advertisement through www.craigslist.org.
Participants were pre-screened for eligibility to ensure their willingness to participate
objectively in a study involving a capital murder trial. Students received extra credit or a
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ten dollar gift card. Community members received a twenty dollar gift card or
volunteered their participation.
After screening for eligibility, 50 participants were excluded via their
questionnaire responses. These individuals were excluded for non-death qualification
status, voting not guilty after reading the summary of the guilt phase, failing to qualify
for jury eligibility or indicating they did not take their role as juror seriously in this study.
The remaining sample was 60 undergraduate students (48%) and 64 community members
(52%). With respect to demographic information, the sample consisted of slightly more
female (57%) than male (43%) participants and a majority of the participants (74%) were
between the ages of 18-35 years, while the remainder (26%) were 35 years or older.
Almost the entire sample was Caucasion (97%) and nearly three-quarters (72%)
classified themselves as having either a liberal or slightly liberal political orientations.
Design and Procedure
A two (Participant Type: community members vs. undergraduate students) x three
(Instruction Type: general v. specific v. no misconduct instructions) between subjects
factorial design was used. In the specific misconduct instruction condition (based on
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 1974), the judge instructed the jury as follows:
Closing arguments are not evidence for your consideration. In his closing
argument, the prosecutor made several statements relating to the
following: his personal discretion in seeking the death penalty; the impact
of the loss of the victim on the family; the relation between deterrence and
punishment; mischaracterizations of your role as jurors, and justification
for seeking the death penalty. He has also made several inflammatory
comments designed to elicit sympathy, passion, or prejudice. Consider the
case as though no such statements were made.
In the general instruction condition (based on Weaver v. Bowersox, 2006), the judge
instructed the jury “Closing arguments are not evidence for your consideration. As such,
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you should not use sympathy, passion, or prejudice when arriving at a decision”. In the
No instruction condition, the judge gave no instruction regarding closing arguments or
the prosecutor’s conduct. In all three experimental conditions, the prosecutor’s closing
argument contained 15 improper statements, which were un-objected to. Other variables
examined were participant type and sentence recommendation.
Participants first read a summary of the guilt phase of a capital murder trial (based on
Brooks v. State, 1977) and rendered a verdict: guilty or not guilty. Participants then
completed the pre-trial questionnaire and were randomly assigned to view 1 of 3
videotaped reenactments of the penalty phase of the trial, in which they were instructed to
imagine themselves as a juror in this case. Participants were tested individually and in
groups ranging from 2 to 30. After viewing the videotape participants completed the
post-trial measures designed to assess juror perceptions of the penalty phase and juror
decision making processes. Those who voted not guilty were excluded from analysis.
The experiment lasted approximately 1 hour.
Stimulus Materials
Pre-trial Questionnaire. The pre-trial questionnaire consisted of a series of 12
demographic items: gender, age, ethnicity, religious affiliation, marital status, parental
status, political orientation, prior jury service (civil and criminal), occupation, education
and relation to someone in the justice system. Additional demographic items used as
exclusion criteria were: voter registration, possession of a valid driver’s license, death
qualification status and views regarding the death penalty. Death qualification status was
determined by asking whether the participant’s “views on the death penalty, either in
favor or opposed, would prevent or substantially impair their performance as a juror in

17

this case” based on the Witt standard question (Wainwright v Witt, 1985). Participants
were asked to indicate their views regarding the death penalty: appropriate in all cases
where someone is murdered, generally appropriate with very few exceptions, generally
opposed with very few exceptions, or opposed in every possible case where someone has
been murdered. Those who indicated that the death penalty was appropriate in all cases
where someone is murdered were excluded from analysis.
Pre-trial Scales. The pre-trial questionnaire also consisted of two scales assessing
the role of individual differences (i.e. attitudes toward the death penalty and affect).
These scales included the Attitudes Towards the Death Penalty Scale (ATDP) (O’Neil et
al., 2004) and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule Expanded (PANAS-X). The
ATDP Scale is a 5-factor, 15-item scale measuring participants’ attitudes toward the
death penalty on a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 1=Strongly Disagree to 9=Strongly
Agree using the following subscales: General Support, Retribution and Revenge, Death
Penalty is a Deterrent, Death Penalty is Cheaper, and LWOP Allows Parole. It was
constructed and validated over the course of 11 studies and was found to be moderately
predictive of sentencing verdicts (mean total effect = 0.39), with reliability coefficients
for each subscale ranging from r = 0.69 to 0.89 (O’Neil et al., 2004). The PANAS-X is a
60-item scale measuring general dimensions of positive and negative affect as well as 11
specific affects: Fear, Sadness, Guilt, Hostility, Shyness, Fatigue, Surprise, Joviality,
Self-Assurance, Attentiveness, and Serenity. It consists of a number of words and
phrases that describe different feelings and emotions. Participants are instructed to
indicate to what extent they feel this way right now on a scale of 1 = Very slightly or not
at all to 5 = Extremely. Validation studies have established that trait scores on the
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PANAS-X are stable over time, show significant convergent and discriminate validity,
are highly correlated with corresponding measures of affect, and are strongly related to
measures of personality and emotionality (Watson & Clark, 1994).
Videotaped Penalty Phase. The videotape was based on the penalty phase of the
trial of William Anthony Brooks (Brooks v. State, 1977). It was filmed in a mock
courtroom setting from a juror’s perspective. The videotapes ranged in length from 37 to
38 minutes and consisted of: 1) a summary of the guilt phase read to them by the judge,
2) each closing argument, and 3) judge’s instructions. The judge and both attorneys were
portrayed by male law school professors or professional actors.
Post-trial Questionnaire. After viewing the videotape, participants were first
asked to respond to a series of questions to assess instruction comprehension, agreement
with the judges’ instructions and the evaluation of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. Instruction comprehension was measured by a combination of 3 items
reflecting participants’ agreement with mitigating decision rules and the true task of the
sentencing phase on an 8-point Likert scale. To measure consideration of aggravating
and mitigating factors, participants rated the degree to which they would consider each
factor on a scale of 1 = Not considered at all to 8 = Completely considered.
Participants were then asked to recommend a sentence for the defendant: life in
prison or death by lethal injection. They were also asked how deserving the defendant
was to receive death by lethal injection on a scale of 1 = Not at all deserving to 8 =
Completely deserving and provided a confidence rating of their sentence decision on a 8point Likert-type scale. Participants also responded to items measuring the degree to
which each misconduct statement was considered to be important to their sentencing
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decision on a 8-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = Not considered at all to 8 =
Completely considered. Finally, they completed the basic positive affect and basic
negative affect subscales of the PANAS-X Scale (See Appendix for all stimulus materials
and measures).
Results
The Role of Individual Differences
Predicting the Acceptability of Prosecutorial Misconduct. The first hypothesis
predicted that death penalty attitudes, instruction comprehension and affect would predict
juror acceptance of prosecutorial misconduct and other decision making processes in the
presence of misconduct. To measure consideration of the prosecutorial misconduct,
participants rated the degree to which they considered each of the 15 misconduct
statements on a scale of 1 to 8. With a Cronbach’s of alpha = .89, these items were
combined to create a total consideration of misconduct score (TCM). Scores ranged from
15 to 116, M = 70.53, Median = 72.00, N= 121 with high scores indicating high levels of
consideration of the prosecutorial misconduct.
A multiple regression analysis investigated the predictive ability of the four
individual difference variables (ATDP, Pre-trial PANAS-X Positive Affect, Pre-trial
PANAS-X Negative Affect, and instruction comprehension) in explaining the variance of
total consideration of misconduct scores (TCM). The Cronbach’s alpha = .75 for the
ATDP Scale with a normal distribution. Scores ranged from 15 to 101, M = 70.94,
Median = 72.00, N = 121, with high scores indicating support of the death penalty.
Affect was measured with the PANAS-X (Pre-test Basic Positive and Basic Negative
Affect Pre-test Subscales). The basic positive subscale consisted of 17 items measuring:
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Joviality, Self-Assurance and Attentiveness. The basic negative subscale included 23
items measuring: Fear, Sadness, Guilt, and Hostility. Reliability analysis of the PANASX revealed a Cronbach’s alpha = .91 for the Pre-Positive Subscale and a Cronbach’s
alpha = .85 for the Pre-Negative Subscale. Scores on the pre-positive subscale ranged
from 24 to 80 out of a possible 17 to 85, M = 45.82, SD = 11.40, Median = 46, N = 122.
Scores on the pre-negative subscale ranged from 23 to 49 out of a possible 23 to 115, M =
28.19, SD = 6.20, Median = 26, N = 122. High scores are indicative of current
heightened emotional experience.
Instruction comprehension was measured by a combination of 3 items reflecting
participants’ agreement with mitigating decision rules and the true task of the sentencing
phase: “Closing arguments are evidence for consideration”, “Mitigating circumstances
not agreed upon by all jurors can be considered” and “Sentence is determined only by the
existence of aggravating and mitigating factors”. After recoding the item related to
closing arguments to ensure that high scores are indicative of good instruction
comprehension, these items were combined to create an instruction comprehension score.
This score was conceptualized based on face validity, and was not meant to be internally
consistent as each item assessed agreement with a different aspect of the sentencing
phase task as outlined in the judge’s instructions. Scores ranged from 6 to 24 out of a
possible 3 to 24, M = 15.31, Median = 15, N = 121.
Overall, the results revealed that the model significantly predicted consideration
of the prosecutor’s improper statements, F (4, 112) = 6.02, p < .001; R2 = .18. Table 1
displays the standardized beta coefficients and part correlation coefficients for each
significant variable in this model. Individuals’ ATDP Scores (β = .33, r2 = .10) and
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Instruction Comprehension scores (β = -.23, r2 = .05) were significant predictors in this
model, uniquely explaining 10% and 5% of the variance respectively. Consistent with
predictions, the higher an individual’s ATDP scores in support of the death penalty, the
higher his or her consideration of prosecutorial misconduct. As individual’s instruction
comprehension decreased, his or her consideration of prosecutorial misconduct increased.
Predicting Consideration of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. To assess
participants’ overall consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors, they responded
to the items: “How much did you consider aggravating circumstances when making your
decision?” and “How much did you consider mitigating circumstances when making your
decision?” on a scale of 1 = Not considered at all to 8 = Completely considered. A
multiple regression analysis investigated the predictive ability of the four individual
difference variables (ATDP, Pre-trial PANAS-X Positive Affect, Pre-trial PANAS-X
Negative Affect, and instruction comprehension) in explaining participants’ overall
consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors. Overall, the model significantly
predicted participants responses to both the aggravating item, F (4, 115) = 5.26, p = .001;
R2 = .16 and the mitigating item, F (4, 115) = 4.49, p = .002; R2 = .14. Table 1 displays
the standardized beta coefficients and part correlation coefficients for each significant
variable. For the aggravating item, pre-trial positive affect scores (β = .34, r2 = .14) and
ATDP scores (β = -.20, r2 = .04) were significant predictors in the model, uniquely
explaining 14% and 4% of the variance respectively. As ATDP scores increased,
consideration of aggravating factors decreased. The remaining analyses reveal additional
mixed findings with respect to participants’ evaluations of aggravating factors, which is
addressed in the discussion section. For the mitigating item, pre-trial positive affect
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scores (β = .30, r2 = .05) and instruction comprehension (β = .20, r2 = .04) were
significant predictors, uniquely explaining 9% and 4% of the variance of the model
respectively. As positive mood scores increased and instruction comprehension scores
increased, consideration of mitigating items also increased.
Predicting Sentence Recommendation. Direct logistic regression was also
performed to assess the impact of the individual difference variables (attitudes toward the
death penalty, instruction comprehension and affect) and total consideration of
misconduct scores on the likelihood that participants would vote for the death penalty.
The full model containing all predictors was significant, χ2 (5, N = 124) = 22.04, p =
.001, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between participants who voted for
death by lethal injection and those who voted for life in prison. The model as a whole
explained between 17.2% (Cox and Snell R Square) and 23% (Nagelkerke R Square) of
the variance in sentence outcome and correctly classified 67.5% of cases.
Only two of the individual difference variables made a unique statistically
significant contribution to the model (Total Consideration of Misconduct Scores (TCM)
and Attitudes Towards the Death Penalty Scores (ATDP)). The more participants
considered the improper statements and the stronger their support for the death penalty,
the more likely they were to sentence the defendant to death. The ATDP Scores and
TCM Scores were similarly strong predictors, reporting odds ratios of 1.04 and 1.03
respectively. This indicated that participants whose attitudes support the death penalty
and participants who took the improper statements into consideration were both over 1
time more likely to vote for the death penalty than those with less supportive attitudes
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toward the death penalty and those who were not likely to consider the misconduct
controlling for all other factors in the model.
Instructions as a Legal Safeguard
Sentence Recommendation. The second hypothesis predicted that judicial
instructions would moderate the impact of prosecutorial misconduct as measured by
sentence outcome, consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors and consideration
of misconduct statements. First, a loglinear analysis investigated the effect of instruction
type and participant type on sentence recommendation. A significant participant by
sentence association was found: χ2(1, N = 124) = 7.67, p = .006. Post hoc
crosstabulation found students more likely to vote for the death penalty compared to
community members: χ2 (1, N = 124) = 7.58, p = .006. Figure 1 displays the proportion
of participants willing to impose the death as a function of participant type. The
proportion of students who sentenced the defendant to death was 41 of 60 (68%)
compared to 28 of 64 (44%) for community members. The predicted main effect for
instruction type was nonsignificant: χ2(1, N = 124) = .73, p > .05. Due to the relatively
even overall sentence recommendation split of 44% life in prison and 56% death penalty,
sentence recommendation was considered as an independent variable in the remaining
analyses.
Consideration of Aggravating Factors. Next, a two (Participant Type) x two
(Sentence Recommendation) x three (Instruction Type) multivariate analysis of variance
investigated the effect of sentence recommendation, participant type and instruction type
on individuals’ consideration of the 3 statutory aggravating factors: a) The murdered
individual was killed in the course of another felony, b) The murdered individual was
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actually killed by the defendant, and c) The defendant acted with intent to kill the
murdered victim. These items were moderately positively correlated ranging from .27 to
.73 at p < .001. The results revealed a significant participant type x instruction type
interaction for the item, “The murdered individual was actually killed by the defendant”,
F (6, 220) = 2.20; p = .044; Wilks’ Lambda = .89; partial eta squared = .07. Students
given no instruction (M = 7.00, SD = 2.15) were significantly less likely to take this
factor into consideration, while community members given no instruction (M = 7.48, SD
= .55) were the most likely to take this factor into consideration.
The results also revealed a main effect for sentence recommendation on one
aggravating factor, F (3, 110) = 2.89, p = .039; Wilks’ Lambda = .93; partial eta squared
= 07. Participants who voted for the death penalty were more likely to consider that the
defendant acted with the intent to kill than those who recommended life imprisonment (M
DP =

7.08; MLIP = 6.32).
Consideration of Mitigating Factors. A two (Participant Type) x two (Sentence

Recommendation) x three (Instruction Type) multivariate analysis of variance was also
conducted on the 4 mitigating items: a) The defendant has no significant history of prior
criminal activity, b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, c) The capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law were substantially impaired, d) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
These items were moderately positively correlated ranging from .22 to .80. The results
revealed a significant participant type x instruction type interaction on one mitigating
factor, F (8, 218) = 2.26, p = .024; Wilks’ Lambda = .85; partial eta squared = .01.
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Students given no judicial instruction were the least likely to consider that the defendant
had no significant prior criminal activity.
The results also indicated a significant main effect for participant type on three of
the four factors, F (4, 109) = 5.88, p < .0005; Wilks’ Lambda = .82; partial eta squared =
.18. Community members were more likely to consider that the defendant acted under
extreme mental disturbance (M cm = 5.91; Mstudents = 4.35), the age of the defendant at the
time of the crime (M cm = 5.36; Mstudents = 4.09), and the defendant’s capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions or to conform his action to the requirements of
the law (M cm = 5.89; Mstudents = 4.13).
Consideration of Misconduct. A two (Participant Type) x two (Sentence
Recommendation) x three (Instruction Type) analysis of variance investigated the
influence of sentence recommendation, participant type and instruction type on total
consideration of misconduct scores (TCM). Results revealed a significant participant x
instruction interaction, F (2, 109) = 3.90; p = .023; partial eta squared .17. Figure 2
displays mean TCM scores as a function of Participant type and Instruction type.
Consistent with our hypothesis community members exposed to specific judicial
instructions to disregard the improper statements were the least likely to consider these
statements when making their sentencing decision (M = 59.51, SD =26.67) in contrast
with students exposed to the same instructions who were the most likely to consider the
improper statements (M = 79.15, SD= 18.78).
Results also revealed a significant instruction x sentence interaction, F (2, 109) =
3.94; p = .022; partial eta squared .07. Participants who voted for death by lethal
injection were the most likely to consider the misconduct statements when given no
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judicial instruction. Results revealed a main effect for participant type, F (1, 109) = 6.09,
p = .015; partial eta squared .05 and a main effect for sentence recommendation, F (1,
109) = 12.62, p = .001; partial eta squared .10. Students were more likely to take the
misconduct statements into consideration than community members (M cm = 65.15;
Mstudents = 74.42). Individuals who voted for death by lethal injection were more likely to
consider the prosecutorial misconduct than those who voted for life in prison (M DP =
76.45; MLIP = 63.11). The predicted main effect for instruction type was nonsignificant,
F (2, 109) = .305, p > .05.
Demographic Variables by Participant Type
Participant type emerged as a significant variable in participants’ consideration of
misconduct, aggravating and mitigating factors and sentencing outcomes. Therefore, a
series of chi-square tests of independence were conducted to explore potential differences
between these groups on a number of demographic variables deemed important to legal
decision making. Results revealed no significant differences between students and
community members on the following demographic variables: religion, χ2 (1, N = 124) =
.53, p > .05, gender, χ2 (1, N = 124) = .73, p > .05, political views, χ2 (1, N = 123) = .02,
p > .05 and relation to someone in the justice system, χ2 (1, N = 124) = 1.18, p > .05.
There was a significant difference in prior jury service both in a criminal case, χ2
(1, N = 124) = 8.02, p = .005 and in a civil case, χ2 (1, N = 124) = 3.88, p = .05.
However comparisons were small: 8 of 64 (6.5%) of community members v. 0 of 60
(0%) of students had served on a jury in a criminal trial and 4 of 64 (3.2%) of community
members vs. 0 of 60 (0%) of students had served on a jury in a civil trial.
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Mixed Model. A two (Participant Type) x two (Sentence Recommendation) x
three (Instruction Type) mixed analysis of variance investigated the impact of sentence
recommendation, participant type and instruction type on participants’ affect scores preand post-trial. There was a significant change in Negative Affect scores, F (1, 108) =
26.27, p < .0005; Wilks’ Lambda = .80; partial eta squared .20. Individuals experienced
an increase in negative emotions from pre- (M = 28.30) to post-trial (M = 31.93). There
was also as significant change in Positive Affect scores, F (1, 107) = 115.40, p < .0005;
Wilks’ Lambda = .48; partial eta squared = .52. Individuals experienced a decrease in
positive emotions from pre- (M = 45.71) to post-trial (M = 37.20). The predicted
interaction between affect and instruction type was nonsignificant, F (1, 107) = 1.15, p >
.05; Wilks’ Lambda = .98. The presence of judicial instruction did not impact
participants’ changes in positive or negative affect scores from pre- to post-trial.
Discussion
The Role of Individual Differences
The primary aim of the current study was to explore whether and to what extent
individual differences established in voir dire predict the acceptability of prosecutorial
misconduct and influence the effectiveness of judicial instructions as measured by
sentence outcome, and the consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors. In
support of the primary hypothesis, attitudes toward the death penalty, instruction
comprehension and juror affect were together a significant predictive model of
individuals’ total consideration of misconduct statements, consideration of aggravating
and mitigating factors and sentence outcome.
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Attitudes Towards the Death Penalty. Overall, attitudes toward the death penalty
were the strongest predictor, making a unique contribution to three of the four primary
dependent measures: sentence outcome, consideration of misconduct and consideration of
aggravating factors. As death penalty support increased, consideration of prosecutorial
misconduct and death sentences also increased. However, the opposite effect occurred
when considering aggravating factors. As death penalty support increased, general
consideration of aggravating factors decreased, suggesting a more complex relationship
may exist between ATDP scores and the evaluation of aggravating factors. Overall, there
was considerable variation in participants’ consideration of each aggravating item when
asked about these items individually. One possible explanation for this finding is that
strong supporters of the death penalty may have had a lower threshold for consideration
of aggravating factors, perhaps because they were more likely to impose the death
penalty and considered only those factors that would challenge their verdict of
preference.
Affect. Positive mood scores significantly predicted consideration of both
aggravating and mitigating factors. When participants scored high on positive affect
including items measuring joviality, self-assurance and attentiveness, they were more
likely to consider both aggravating and mitigating factors. According to the theory of
affect infusion, individuals are more likely to make mood-congruent judgments as the
complexity of the task increases. However, results of the present study suggest that juror
decision making in the presence of prosecutorial misconduct is not necessarily moodcongruent as mood was not a significant predictor of sentence outcome. Individuals
experienced an increase in negative mood and a decrease in positive mood from pre- to
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post-trial, which did not vary as a function of their sentence recommendation or the
presence or absence of judicial instructions. As with any repeated measure design,
caution should be used when interpreting this result. Therefore, no causal inferences can
be made as to what initiated this shift in mood. Results do suggest that positive mood
plays an important role when evaluating aggravating and mitigating factors in the
presence of misconduct.
Instruction Comprehension. Instruction comprehension also emerged as a
significant individual difference variable, predicting participants’ consideration of
misconduct statements and consideration of mitigating factors. Previous research
demonstrates that jurors’ comprehension of mitigating decision rules is particularly poor
(Luginbuhl, 1992). Consistent with the existing literature examining the relationship
between instruction comprehension and evaluation of mitigating circumstances, results of
the present study revealed that as instruction comprehension increased, consideration of
mitigating factors also increased. As instruction comprehension scores increased,
consideration of misconduct statements also increased. These results suggest that
instruction comprehension may serve as a protective factor in the presence of
prosecutorial misconduct.
Judicial Instruction as a Legal Safeguard
The second purpose of the current study was to further explore the effectiveness
of judicial instructions as a legal safeguard. In contrast to previous research, the present
study did not support the predicted moderating effect of instruction type on sentence
recommendation, deservingness of death, evaluation of aggravating and mitigating
factors and consideration of the prosecutors’ 15 improper closing argument statements.
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However, results revealed that the effectiveness of judicial instructions varied as a
function of participant type.
Participant Type. Specific instructions to disregard improper prosecutor
statements were an effective legal safeguard among community members. Community
members were not only less likely to consider improper statements, they were also more
likely to vote for life in prison and more likely to consider 4 of the 5 mitigating factors.
The absence of instructions was particularly harmful for the student sample, while
community members appeared to benefit from the presence of instruction. Although they
were not significantly different from community members on their support of the death
penalty, political views or other important demographic items, students judged William
Anthony Brooks much more harshly than community members. Students more likely to
vote for the death penalty, found the defendant more deserving of the death penalty, were
less likely to consider mitigating factors in favor of life imprisonment and were more
likely to consider misconduct statements than community members, regardless of
instruction type. One exception occurred in students’ lower consideration of the
aggravating item: “The murdered individual was actually killed by the defendant”. One
possible explanation for this finding is that students may have disregarded this item as
important to this case due to the presence of Brooks’ own written confession to the crime.
With such overwhelming evidence of his guilt, students may not have taken this factor
into consideration, having accepted it as fact.
Limitations
Similar to other simulated capital trial studies, the weaknesses of the current study
reflect limitations in recreating the intensity of an actual capital trial. Although this study
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controlled for participant jurors’ perceptions of how serious they took their role as a juror
in this case, it is difficult to assess the degree to which individuals’ participation in this
experiment approached the level of seriousness and responsibility associated with serving
as a juror in an actual capital case.
Also, a more comprehensive and representative measure of instruction
comprehension would be necessary to further investigate the role of instruction
comprehension in the effectiveness of judicial instructions as a legal safeguard. The
current measure of instruction comprehension was insufficient in yielding information
regarding the degree to which participants heard the instructions, agreed with the
instructions and took these instructions into consideration when evaluating aggravating
and mitigating factors and determining sentence outcome.
Future Directions
The nonsignificant effect for the primary manipulation of instruction type raises
important questions about the effectiveness of the instructions as a legal safeguard,
particularly among undergraduate students. Perhaps a more salient instruction in the
form of an immediate admonition after each improper statement is necessary to impact
juror decision making. Future research should investigate this and other ways to improve
legal safeguards against prosecutorial misconduct. Also, future research exploring the
role of mood in both the presence and absence of misconduct could provide meaningful
insight into the results of the current study with respect to juror affect and help to gain an
understanding of how misconduct impacts jurors as they consider aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and other decision making processes.
Finally, future research should also address the role of deliberations in jurors’
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decision making processes in the presence of prosecutorial misconduct. A qualitative
analysis of jury deliberations could help to inform legal professionals and policy makers
of the degree to which jurors adhere to and acknowledge judicial instructions, the degree
to which individual difference variables found to influence sentencing decisions in this
context influence the deliberation process.
Summary
Overall, results of the present study support the findings of previous empirical
research demonstrating the harmful impact of improper remarks in the penalty phase of a
capital trial. Participants’ overall consideration of prosecutorial misconduct was a
significant predictor of sentence recommendation. Individuals who took the improper
statements into consideration were more likely to sentence the defendant to death.
Results of this study may have implications for the validity of judicial instructions as a
legal safeguard and support the need for policy reform to improve prosecutorial
accountability for misconduct and other issues contributing to wrongful convictions.
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Table Caption

Table 1. Summary of Multiple Regression Analyses for Individual Difference Variables

TCM Scores
Variable
Instruction
Comprehension
Pre-Trial
Positive Affect
ATDP

β

sr2

.31

.05

_

_

.31

.10

Aggravating Factors

β

sr2

_

_

.34

.14

-.20

.04

Mitigating Factors

β

sr2

.20

.04

.30

.05

_

_

Note. R2s range from .14 to .18; ∆R2s range from .14 to .18 (ps < .002). sr2 = part correlation
coefficients. N = 117 for TCM Scores. N = 120 for Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
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Figure Caption
Figure 1. Sentence Recommendation as a Function of Participant Type.
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Figure Caption
Figure 2. TCM Scores as a Function of Participant Type and Instruction Type

39

Appendix A
Summary of Guilt Phase
Please read through the following summary of the guilt phase of a capital trial and render
a verdict based on the facts presented.

William Anthony Brooks the defendant in this case, has been charged with the
kidnapping and first-degree murder of Carol Jeanine Galloway. The evidence established
that Brooks abducted Miss Galloway from her home, forced her against her will into her
small red Honda automobile, took her to a secluded area and shot her. The young woman
was going to meet a friend for breakfast. All this was established by Brooks’ own written
confession, and was corroborated by independent evidence. In his confession, Brooks
also stated that, at one point Miss Galloway started screaming and at that point he aimed
his pistol at her to make her stop screaming. He stated that the pistol fired and struck her
in the throat. Brooks fled at that point and Galloway bled to death. There is no dispute
about any of these facts.

As a result of reading the facts in this case, do you find the defendant, William Anthony
Brooks:
 Not Guilty

[1]

 Guilty

[2]

of the charges of kidnapping and first-degree murder of Carol Jeanine Galloway.
Please submit this completed form to the researcher. Thank you.
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Pre-trial Survey Instrument
Thank you for agreeing to participate in our study. Your responses are important to our
research. Please answer every question on this form by placing a check in the box that
corresponds to the appropriate response.

Your gender:
 Male

[1]

 Female

[2]

Into which of the following age categories do you fall:
 18-24

[1]

 25-34

[2]

 35-44

[3]

 45-54

[4]

 55-64

[5]

 65 or older

[6]

Which of the following characterizes your background?
 Caucasian

[1]

 Hispanic

[2]

 African-American

[3]

 Other

[4]
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What is your religious affiliation?
 Catholic

[1]

 Protestant

[2]

 Jewish

[3]

 Muslim

[4]

 Other

[5]

Your marital status:
 Single

[1]

 Married

[2]

 Separated

[3]

 Divorced

[4]

 Widowed

[5]

Do you have any children?
 No

[1]

 Yes

[2]

How would you evaluate your political views?
 Liberal

[1]

 Slightly Liberal

[2]

 Slightly Conservative

[3]

 Conservative

[4]
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Do you have a valid driver’s license?
 No

[1]

 Yes

[2]

Are you a registered voter?
 No

[1]

 Yes

[2]

Have you ever served on a jury in a civil case?
 No

[1]

 Yes

[2]

Have you ever served on a jury in a criminal case?
 No

[1]

 Yes

[2]

What is your employment status? (Only check one)
 Not working now/unemployed

[1]

 Retired

[2]

 Student

[3]

 Homemaker

[4]

 Employed full-time

[5]

 Employed part-time

[6]
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Are you, a close friend of, or related to, anyone employed in the justice system? (police
officer, judge, attorney, etc.)
 No

[1]

 Yes

[2]

What is the highest year of education you have attained?
 Less than high school

[1]

 Attended some high school

[2]

 High school diploma

[3]

 Partial college or junior college

[4]

 College degree

[5]

 Post-graduate college degree

[6]

Do you feel that your views on the death penalty, either in favor or opposed, would
prevent or substantially impair you from considering both penalties in this case? (Life in
prison vs. death penalty)
 No

[1]

 Yes

[2]

Which of the following best describes your view regarding the death penalty?
 Appropriate in all cases where someone has been murdered.

[1]

 Generally appropriate with very few exceptions.

[2]

 Generally opposed with very few exceptions.

[3]

 Opposed in every possible case where someone has been murdered.

[4]
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This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and
emotions. Read each item and mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word.
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now. Use the following scale to record
your answers:
1
very slightly
or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

______ cheerful

______ tired

______ disgusted

______ amazed

______ attentive

______ shaky

______ bashful

______ happy

______ sluggish

______ timid

______ daring

______ alone

______ surprised

______ alert

______ strong

______ upset

______ scornful

______ angry

______ relaxed

______ bold

______ irritable

______ blue

______ delighted

______ shy

______ inspired

______ active

______ fearless

______ guilty

______ disgusted with self

______ joyful

______ sad

______ nervous

______ calm

______ lonely

______ afraid

______ sleepy

5
extremely
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______ excited

______ sheepish

______ hostile

______ distressed

______ proud

______ blameworthy

______ jittery

______ determine

______ lively

______ frightened

______ ashamed

______ astonished

______ at ease

______ interested

______ scared

______ loathing

______ drowsy

______ confident

______ angry at self

______ energetic

______ enthusiastic

______ concentrating

______ downhearted

______ dissatisfied with self
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Please circle the number that corresponds most closely to how you feel.

It is immoral for society to take a life regardless of the crime the individual has
committed.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly disagree

9
Strongly agree

Executing a person for premeditated murder discourages others from committing that
crime in the future.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly disagree

9
Strongly agree

The death penalty is the just way to compensate the victim’s family for some murders.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly disagree

9
Strongly agree

It is more cost efficient to sentence a murderer to death rather than to life imprisonment.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly disagree

9
Strongly agree

The death penalty should be used more often than it is.
1

2

Strongly disagree

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
Strongly agree
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There are some murderers whose death would give me a sense of personal satisfaction.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly disagree

9
Strongly agree

There is no such thing as a sentence that truly means "life without parole."
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly disagree

9
Strongly agree

The desire for revenge is a legitimate reason for favoring the death penalty.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly disagree

9
Strongly agree

Executing a murderer is less expensive than keeping him in jail for the rest of his life.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly disagree

9
Strongly agree

The death penalty does not deter other murderers.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly disagree

9
Strongly agree

No matter what crime a person has committed executing them is a cruel punishment.
1

2

Strongly disagree

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
Strongly agree
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Even when a murderer gets a sentence of life without parole, he usually gets out on
parole.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly disagree

9
Strongly agree

I think the death penalty is necessary.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly disagree

9
Strongly agree

The death penalty makes criminals think twice before committing murder.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly disagree

9
Strongly agree

Society has a right to get revenge when murder has been committed.
1

2

Strongly disagree

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
Strongly agree
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VIDEOTAPED TRANSCRIPTS
JUDGE: Ladies and Gentlemen, you have just convicted William Anthony Brooks the
defendant in this case, of the kidnapping and first-degree murder of Carol Jeanine
Galloway. The evidence established that Brooks abducted Miss Galloway from her home,
forced her against her will into her small red Honda automobile, took her to a secluded
area and shot her. The young woman was going to meet a friend for breakfast. All this
was established by Brooks’ own written confession, and was corroborated by
independent evidence. In his confession, Brooks also stated that, at one point Miss
Galloway started screaming and at that point he aimed his pistol at her to make her stop
screaming. He stated that the pistol fired and struck her in the throat. Brooks fled at that
point and Galloway bled to death. There is no dispute about any of these facts. At the
completion of William Brooks’ trial he was found guilty of the kidnapping and firstdegree murder of Miss Galloway. The question to you, as jurors in this case, is which
penalty is appropriate for this crime. YOU WILL NOW HEAR CLOSING
ARGUMENTS IN THIS CASE. The prosecutor will argue that you should vote for the
death penalty. You will then hear the defense attorney’s argument for mercy, asking that
you spare the defendant’s life. Finally, I will be providing you with sentencing
instructions. I would like to provide you with two important legal definitions at this time.
You will hear the defense attorney and the prosecutor object to statements made during
their respective closing arguments. When I, the judge overrule the objections, I find the
statement, or line of argument proper and will allow it to be made in court. On the other
hand, if I agree with the attorney’s objection I will sustain the objection and does not
allow the statement to be made in court.
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PROSECUTOR’S CLOSING ARGUMENT
MR. WESTFALL:

May it please the Court, and you, ladies and gentlemen of

the jury, I thank you again for your patience, and this is the last stage of the trial, but, this
is an important part of the trial, just as important as the guilt or innocence stage of the
trial, and we ask you to treat it as such.
By your verdict, you have found this defendant guilty of kidnapping and firstdegree murder, and we’re at the stage of the trial now where we fix his punishment, you
fix his punishment. Punishment has a two-fold purpose, one purpose is to punish the
guilty offender; the other purpose is to deter others of a like mind from committing the
same type of crime. In other words, if somebody else is thinking about murder, if you
punish William Anthony Brooks it’s supposed to deter others from committing murder.
Let me talk about the first purpose, to punish the guilty. Punishment is supposed
to be adequate and appropriate. In other words, the punishment is supposed to fit the
crime, and the crime in this case is murder. He took the life of another person. So, you’ve
got to decide what kind of punishment fits that crime, whether he gets life in prison, or
death. And, we say in these circumstances that the only appropriate punishment is death.
I will have some more to say about that before I sit down.
Let me tell you here at the outset that I am for capital punishment. If you’ve got
to take sides, I take the side of capital punishment. I believe in the death penalty. I think
it’s necessary.
I’m sure Mr. Hedley is going to tell you that there is no proof that the death
penalty deters crime. But, I can tell you this: the last execution in the state was 1994, and
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since that date, crime has increased year by year. And every time the statistics come out,
we have an increase in crime rate. We seldom had this type of crime, we heard about it
happening somewhere else, but not around here.
Now let’s talk a minute about the person who is not here, about Carol Jeannine
Galloway. What kind of a person was she? We know that she was a pretty young lady, a
beautiful young lady. We know that she was about twenty-three years old; she wasn’t
married, she still lived with her mother and father, and we know that she was a person of
high morals. We know that she was a considerate person. We know that she was a
thoughtful person, she was going to treat her friend to breakfast before her friend left
town. As a matter of fact the morning she was kidnapped she was in the driveway,
sparing her parents from having to retrieve the trash bin from the morning’s collection.
So, when Mr. Hedley makes the argument – when he starts talking about Williams
Brooks’ life, and about William Brooks, about what a young person he is, his family.
Think about the Galloway family. And think about Carol Jeannine Galloway who is not
here in the courtroom today, and who will never be here again.
Now, they’re going to tell you not to take Williams Brooks’ life that locking him
up is enough. They’ll say don’t make his family go through that. But I ask you - What has
the Galloway family gone through? Soon, when it’s Thanksgiving, and they are sitting
around the table, Carol Jeannine won’t be there, and never will be there again.
Now, we don’t ask for the death penalty often – I’ve been District Attorney for
seven and a half years, and we don’t take this business of asking for the death penalty
lightly. We don’t come up here on every murder case that we try and say, “Sentence this
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man to death.” In the seven and a half years I’ve been District Attorney, I believe we’ve
only asked for it less than a dozen times. I think it’s nearer eight or nine, but I know it’s
less than twelve.
Now, what do we consider before we come to you and ask you to impose the
death penalty? Well, one thing that we consider is the evidence of the case that’s being
tried. Was it a horrible crime that was committed? And let’s stop there and look at the
facts of this case, and look at what type of crime this was. Here was Carol Jeannine
Galloway on a summer Friday morning, getting ready to go have breakfast with her
friend, she sees a trash can outside the house and decides, “Well, I’ll pick it up and bring
it in for my mother so she won’t have to.” And, along comes William Anthony Brooks,
probably never seen her before and didn’t know her, but he had that pistol in his pocket,
he puts it on her, makes her get into the car, drives her out into the woods; what does he
do, he turns around and shoots her down like you would a sick dog, a stray dog.
But, he didn’t kill her then, he said she was screaming and he shot her, and she
fell, and was still trying to scream, so he said in his statement, but the sound wouldn’t
come out, and she bled to death, very slowly. I pray that she was unconscious. That’s the
kind of condition he left that lady in. You wouldn’t do that, as I said, to a stray animal
that you wanted to get rid of, you wouldn’t treat it like that. But, that’s what Williams
Brooks did to Carol Jeannine Galloway. If you tried to think of a worse crime, could you
think of anything more horrible than what you’re hearing here today, that this defendant
committed on this young lady? Could you think of anything more horrible?

53

All right, and another thing that we consider before we come to you and ask for
the death penalty is the proof in the case, not that we just prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt and you find him guilty, but I mean, overwhelming proof, and you have
that in this case. You’ve already found him guilty, and I’m sure you agree that the
evidence in this case against William Brooks is overwhelming, he did it, there’s no
question about it.
And, another thing we consider before we ask for the death penalty, and I’m sure
you’re going to hear this from the defense, is rehabilitation. Is there any chance that the
defendant might be rehabilitated? And we thought about that in this case. And I submit to
you that there’s no chance that William Anthony Brooks will ever be rehabilitated. Let’s
look at what he did. He’s been in trouble since he was a child. His own sisters testified
that he was a car thief when he was an adolescent. They talked about how he was beaten
by his stepfather, but they never did say what his stepfather was beating him for, maybe
he needed it. There are thousands of children who have been abused and beaten, but they
don’t turn to a life of crime.
Goodness sakes, I got beatings when I was a child; that didn’t give me an excuse
to go out and commit a crime. The fact that he got a beating when he was ten or eleven
years old, does that give him the right to stop at somebody’s house and put a gun in their
back, and drive them down to the woods, and murder them? That’s what they want you to
accept. Just because he got some beatings when he was a child, that you should forgive
him for that, or that he should have a right to do something like that. Our society and our
laws were never designed to accept anything like that, and it’s ridiculous, and I don’t
believe that you’ll accept it.
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Now I’m sure they’re going to say, “He’s a young person, just twenty-two years
old, spare his life.” Well, he’s no child, he’s not fifteen, he’s a grown man. You can vote
when you’re eighteen years old, you can buy cigarettes, you can serve on a jury, have
property in your name when you’re eighteen. He’s four years beyond that; he’s a grown,
mature man.
And another thing, he is young, and if you look around, that’s the group that’s
committing crimes in this country. And if you don’t punish young people, then you’re not
punishing the people who are committing the crimes. He’s a mature man, and he doesn’t
deserve any sympathy from you just because of his age.
Now, I’m sure another question that might be going through your mind at this
time is, “Can I vote to take somebody’s life, can I do it?” I know it’s rough; it would be
hard for me as well. Can I take somebody’s life? Well, the truth of the matter is, you’re
not taking his life, you’re not “pulling the switch”.
The police who investigated this case, who apprehended William Brooks, they’re
not taking his life: the Trial Court Judge who heard the evidence in the preliminary
hearing, he’s not responsible for taking his life. How about the Grand Jury who listened
to the evidence and indicted him for murder; are the Grand Jurors responsible for his life?
Of course not. How about me and my staff, we put the case together and we prosecuted
him, and we’re here now asking for the death penalty, do we feel responsible? I don’t.
And I don’t think anybody in my office does.
How about the man, if he’s executed, who performs the act of executing William
Brooks - is he responsible for taking William Brooks’ life? Of course not. The person
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who is responsible for taking his life is William Brooks himself, and if he’s put to death,
he “pulled the switch” the morning that he was walking along Saint Mary’s Road when
he put the gun in the back of Carol Jeannine Galloway and kidnapped her. That’s when
he took his own life. He’s a grown man, old enough to know what he was doing, and he
knew what he was doing.
Now, I’m sure the argument is going to be made by Mr. Hedley, “Well, the death
penalty is bad; maybe we can do something else.” Well, let me say this to you; I told you
I believe in it. Furthermore, William Brooks believes in the death penalty, he believes in
executing people. He carried Carol Jeannine Galloway down in those woods out of sight
of everybody. He just stepped back at point-blank range within three feet of her and
killed her, shot her. So, he believes in the death penalty, he executed her.
And they may also say, “Can we sympathize, what about sympathy, can’t we be
sympathetic toward him?” The only answer to that is to show him the same sympathy
that he showed Carol Jeannine Galloway, the same sympathy he showed her, after he had
shot her: not one spark of sympathy, not one bit of sympathy did he show for her. His
only thought then was to get away, and he did that. He had gotten his shoes muddy so he
went and bought a new pair of shoes. No remorse at all. He has no sympathy due to him,
and we ask you not to show him any.
All right, I’m sure that the defense is going to make this argument to you, we
don’t have to take his life, you don’t have to take his life, just lock him up, put him away
somewhere where he’ll never be in society again, where he’ll never harm anybody again,
that’s punishment enough, spare his life, just put him away forever. Let’s think about
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that. Going back to what I said a while ago, the first thing is you’ve got to give an
appropriate punishment to fit the crime, and letting him live is not appropriate for the
crimes that he committed, that’s the first thing. And the next thing is that he has
demonstrated that he’s a killer. Anybody who can kill a poor defenseless person will kill
again.
He doesn’t care; life doesn’t mean anything to him. So, you put him in prison.
How about those guards that have to guard him? They have families depending on them,
how do you know he won’t kill one of them?
And, even worse, how about some young prisoner, who is in prison with him,
who is there trying to serve his time, trying to be rehabilitated so he can go back to his
family? He could kill him, a fellow prisoner.
How about if he escapes? And I’m sure you’re going to hear, “Oh, he couldn’t
escape.” But it was the early part of this year, or late last year, I don’t recall exactly
when, that a man escaped from a prison in Tennessee that no one had ever escaped from
before. So, you always have the possibility that he might escape and be out on the streets,
and who knows who it will be next time, whose daughter will it be next time? It was Mrs.
Galloway’s daughter this time, Bobby Murray’s girlfriend; whose girlfriend or daughter
will it be next time?
And I’m going to say this, and maybe you don’t agree with me, but if he’s given
life, it costs money to keep him, thousands of dollars a year to keep a prisoner housed,
fed and clothed, and given medical care. Why should the taxpayers have to keep
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somebody like William Brooks locked up for the rest of his life, when he’s done what
he’s done?
Let me say this to you, during my lifetime this country has been in three wars.
Each time we’ve taken our young men, down to the age of seventeen, trained them, put
guns in their hands, taught them how to kill the enemy, and sent them overseas. They
have killed individuals who were enemies of our country, and when they did – we
decorated them and gave them citations, praised them for it.
Well, we’re in a war again in this country, except that it’s not a foreign nation
we’re at war with, it’s a war against the criminal element in this country – and they’re
winning the war. And if you don’t believe they’re winning, just look around you. You
don’t dare go out on the streets at night and walk around; you don’t dare leave you house
unlocked. In fact, almost everyone I know has added more locks to their house, and
burglar alarms. And, we’ve got a man here in town that makes a living with guard dogs.
And there are security guards everywhere. Why are they there? Because of the criminal
element in this country winning this kind of war.
And, if we can send a 17-year-old young man overseas to kill an enemy soldier, is
it asking too much for you to vote for the death penalty in this case? I submit to you that
William Anthony Brooks is an enemy, and he’s a member of the criminal element, and
he’s our enemy, an enemy of the law-abiding citizens and the people who want to live
peacefully in this country, who want to be secure in their persons and their homes.
You know, lots of times you hear people saying, “You know, something’s got to
be done about this crime wave, what can we do, Mr. Westfall; we’ve got to do something
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about it.” Well, you have an opportunity to do something about it right now. The police
have investigated the case, we’ve prosecuted it the best we know how, and the buck stops
with you today. You can do something about it. You can tell William Brooks, and you
can tell every other criminal like him, that if you come to this county and you commit a
crime, and it’s one of those crimes that’s punishable by death, and if the aggravating
circumstances are there, you will be sentenced to death, that’s what you can do. And, I
believe that will stop some of the crime.
Now, I know it’s going to be a hard decision, it’s not easy, it’s never easy. You
can think about it this way – sometimes the only way for a surgeon to cure cancer is to
remove a limb - and it’s bad to have to remove someone’s arm, for example. Sure that’s
terrible, but it’s done because you save the rest of the body. And, I submit to you that
Williams Brooks is a cancer on the body of society, and if we’re going to save society
and save civilization, then we’ve got to remove him from society.
And, you know, it’s one thing that people who oppose capital punishment can’t
dispute, if he’s put to death, he’ll never commit another crime, he’ll never kill anybody
else.
Now, I ask you, and you’ll hear the judge’s instructions, and in order to impose
the death penalty, you must first find that while the murder was committed that he was
engaged in certain other crimes, namely kidnapping and certainly he was engaged in that
when he committed the murder, he carried her away from her home against her will. You
recall that she had an appointment to eat breakfast, she had no idea she would be going
anywhere other than to the restaurant.
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Now I’m asking you to consider the facts and circumstances of this case. Think
about how at eight-thirty in the morning she went out to the edge of the yard in broad
open daylight, and how he was just walking along with a pistol in his pocket, and
decided, “Well, I’ll make a hustle,” to use his language. And then after he did that, “Well,
I’ll kill her,” so he carried her down in the woods, and shot her, and left her there
bleeding to death. Those are the facts and circumstances we are talking about today. I
believe you’ll vote for the death penalty, I want to you to think about this case, and bring
back a verdict that he be put to death. Thank you.
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DEFENSE ATTORNEY CLOSING ARGUMENT
MR. HEDLEY:

May it please the court. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury,

I’ve been selected to argue this case for you, to plead for William Brooks’ life. This is not
an easy job; it’s hard to get up in front of you now, after this defendant has been found
guilty and ask you to consider sparing his life. First I will ask you to think about the
larger picture of William Anthony Brooks’ life as you contemplate the most
extraordinary and extreme punishments – life in prison or death.
I would like to spend some time discussing some of the time-honored arguments
against the death penalty, which you may have considered before today, in a different
context. The district attorney has argued to you that – these people, the trial court judge,
the District Attorney’s office, and other individuals he named, would not be opposed to
imposing capital punishment. Why should they be - when it is you, the jurors, who must
ultimately decide? None of the people that he has named bear the decision-making
responsibility, of deciding whether this man lives or dies. What the prosecuting district
attorney wants is meaningless now. It is your responsibility now, and only your
responsibility - to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances in this case, nothing
more, nothing less and after doing so – decide on the fate of William Anthony Brooks.
His fate - his life are entirely yours to define through your decision.
The District Attorney stated that you were being called upon to be nothing less
than soldiers in the service of your country. I know some of you have served in the armed
forces. Fulfilling a soldier’s duty is an honorable service of our country. Your duty now
is also in service of our country, and Williams Brooks. All of you have a duty to
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carefully weigh aggravating and mitigating evidence. But, a soldier doesn’t have time to
contemplate, and he isn’t asked to make decisions about whether anyone lives or dies,
and that is the difference, because you have that power, you have that decision-making
responsibility upon your shoulders, as to whether this man will live or die. The
responsibility is weighty, and this is no easy task, that you have been called to complete.
You have the ability to think about the facts, listen to the arguments and the judge’s
instructions, and decide intelligently.
There is now another life at stake, a life that can be extinguished through a legal
gesture and a legal judgment with as much crushing finality as the life destroying nature
of Brooks himself. As you know, you have convicted William Anthony Brooks of
kidnapping and first-degree murder. I’m not going to rely upon rhetoric, or emotional
appeal, but I would like to point out for you several factors that we believe would be
important to your considerations and deliberations on the punishment of the defendant in
this case.
As you know there are only two possible punishments: death penalty, or life
imprisonment. You are now faced with the hardest decision of your life – whether or not
this man is to be given life imprisonment, or is to be put to death. You alone have the
right to decide what justice should be for this man. Your decision will be respected and
carried out by the law. The point I would like to make to you is that no matter what you
do today, no matter what sentence you impose; your decision will not bring back Carol
Jeannine Galloway. Remember that life in prison has virtually the same outcome as the
death penalty for the family of Carol Galloway. Either outcome will not bring her back.
Therefore, I submit to you that no good can come from a verdict for death.
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We all recall from our earliest days, of course, the sixth commandment “Thou
shalt not kill.” The sixth commandment did not say thou shall not kill except when it’s
imposed by the State, thou shalt not kill except when the jury imposes it, thou shalt not
kill except when capital punishment is imposed; it simply says, “Thou shalt not kill.”
MR. WESTFALL:

Objection, Your Honor, to that line of argument, because

the Court is going to charge this jury that they have a right under certain circumstances to
impose the death penalty. Counsel is saying that they shall not kill.
THE COURT: Overruled. Continue, Mr. Hedley
MR. HEDLEY:

The District Attorney has stated that if William Anthony

Brooks is put to death he can never kill again. Remember, however, that life in prison has
virtually the same outcome as the death penalty in this case. William Anthony Brooks
will never be released from prison and therefore could never kill again. The District
Attorney has also stated that the death penalty is a deterrent – that it deters others from
committing the same or similar crimes. However, he failed to provide any evidence to
support that statement. I would argue that the death penalty is not a deterrent. Death
penalty statistics show that the death penalty does not deter the commission of crimes as
it is supposed to. You can rest assured that if there were any studies that demonstrated the
death penalty is a deterrent, the District Attorney certainly would have been able to
provide you with that evidence. That being the case, of what benefit, of what good it is
going to do to put this man to death? To decide for death in this case would eliminate any
possibility of good. It will not bring Carol Galloway back. Deciding for death will not
deter others from committing similar crimes.
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The District Attorney has reviewed the facts of this case with you, and I would
like to comment on them. In this case, of course, you are convinced, beyond a reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of William Brooks. You are convinced that the evidence was
sufficient to prove his guilt. However, is this evidence sufficient to take another human
being’s life? In order to take another person’s life, you should be convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the murder was committed with malice and forethought by this
defendant. Can you be so sure, based upon this evidence that you should order the life of
the defendant to be taken? In this case, it is the contention of the State that William
Anthony Brooks has killed Carol Jeannine Galloway and that his punishment should be
nothing less than death. The District Attorney has asked that you consider the taking of a
life for a life. This is a barbaric trade. This is not a solution. Taking the life of the
defendant will never bring back Carol Jeannine Galloway, nor will it deter others from
committing like crimes.
William Brooks was subjected to persistent and brutal abuse throughout his
childhood. He saw explosive tempers all around him, and they became for him a model
of how to behave. To say the least he grew up in the absence of a nurturing environment.
Through no fault of his own the very volatile feelings inside him were left to fester. He
did not develop internal controls or mechanisms for dealing with his anger. He never
found a place to put it. You heard also, that his mother worked constantly to keep her
children and herself off of welfare. This defendant has hurt himself as well as many
others around him. What you need to consider is: What forces pushed him in that
direction? But will any of this excuse what happened? Nothing excuses or justifies his
crime. Let me remind you what is not before you. This is not about whether the defendant
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will be excused. There is no excuse for what William Brooks did. When you consider
mitigating evidence it isn’t to excuse or justify. He is responsible for what he did. That’s
why we are here, at the point of sentencing. Mitigating evidence is offered to help you
understand what he did, not to excuse or justify it.
We learn about the place of mercy and compassion. Here the law makes room for
mercy and compassion. We are proud of our law because it allows us to show mercy. If
you find mitigation that can be a reason to give life – anything about William Brooks’ life
and background, or about his behavior in prison that makes him worthy of not being
killed – If anything merits mercy whether you’ve heard it or not, you can vote for life in
prison rather than death. So ladies and gentlemen, you have heard my points on this
position. We ask, on behalf of the defense, that you put William away in the penitentiary
for the rest of his natural life. Truly, that is not a pleasant thing either. However, it is the
only choice that we believe is appropriate in this case.

Thank you.
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JUDGE'S INSTRUCTIONS
No Misconduct Instructions
It is now your duty to determine what punishment will be imposed upon the
defendant for his crime of first-degree murder. Sentence is determined exclusively by the
existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. If you recommend the death
penalty, then the court is required by law to sentence the defendant to death. On the other
hand, if you can see fit to recommend mercy for the defendant, then the court is required
by law to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. Your first responsibility as a juror
is to determine whether any mitigating or aggravating circumstances existed at the time
the murder was committed. You are authorized to recommend the death penalty only if
you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of one or more of three statutory
aggravating circumstances. A defendant who at the time of the crime has attained the age
of 18 or more and who has been found guilty of first degree murder may be sentenced to
death if: (a) The murdered individual was killed in the course of another felony
[kidnapping], (b) The murdered individual was actually killed by the defendant, and (c)
The defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual. If you recommend a
life sentence then the court is required by law to sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment. Among the mitigating circumstances you may consider: (a) The defendant
has no significant history of prior criminal activity, (b) The capital felony was committed
while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,
(c) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law were substantially impaired, (d) The age
of the defendant at the time of the crime, (e) Any other aspect of the defendant's character
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or record or any other circumstances of the offense. Each aggravating circumstance must
be established beyond a reasonable doubt. If you are reasonably convinced that
mitigating circumstances exist you may consider it as established. Your sentence must be
based on these considerations, carefully considering all of the evidence realizing that a
human life is at stake and bring to bear your best judgment in reaching your sentence.
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General Misconduct Instructions
It is now your duty to determine what punishment will be imposed upon the
defendant for his crime of first-degree murder. Sentence is determined exclusively by the
existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. If you recommend the death
penalty, then the court is required by law to sentence the defendant to death. On the other
hand, if you can see fit to recommend mercy for the defendant, then the court is required
by law to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. Your first responsibility as a juror
is to determine whether any mitigating or aggravating circumstances existed at the time
the murder was committed. You are authorized to recommend the death penalty only if
you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of one or more of three statutory
aggravating circumstances. A defendant who at the time of the crime has attained the age
of 18 or more and who has been found guilty of first degree murder may be sentenced to
death if: (a) The murdered individual was killed in the course of another felony
[kidnapping], (b) The murdered individual was actually killed by the defendant, and (c)
The defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual. If you recommend a
life sentence then the court is required by law to sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment. Among the mitigating circumstances you may consider: (a) The defendant
has no significant history of prior criminal activity, (b) The capital felony was committed
while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,
(c) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law were substantially impaired, (d) The age
of the defendant at the time of the crime, (e) Any other aspect of the defendant's character
or record or any other circumstances of the offense. Each aggravating circumstance must
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be established beyond a reasonable doubt. If you are reasonably convinced that
mitigating circumstances exist you may consider it as established. Your sentence must be
based on these considerations. Closing arguments are not evidence for your
consideration. As such, you should not use sympathy, passion, or prejudice when arriving
at a decision. Please consider carefully all of the evidence presented, realizing that a
human life is at stake and bring to bear your best judgment in reaching your sentence.
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Specific Misconduct Instructions
It is now your duty to determine what punishment will be imposed upon the
defendant for his crime of first-degree murder. Sentence is determined exclusively by the
existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. If you recommend the death
penalty, then the court is required by law to sentence the defendant to death. On the other
hand, if you can see fit to recommend mercy for the defendant, then the court is required
by law to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. Your first responsibility as a juror
is to determine whether any mitigating or aggravating circumstances existed at the time
the murder was committed. You are authorized to recommend the death penalty only if
you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of one or more of three statutory
aggravating circumstances. A defendant who at the time of the crime has attained the age
of 18 or more and who has been found guilty of first degree murder may be sentenced to
death if: (a) The murdered individual was killed in the course of another felony
[kidnapping], (b) The murdered individual was actually killed by the defendant, and (c)
The defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual. If you recommend a
life sentence then the court is required by law to sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment. Among the mitigating circumstances you may consider: (a) The defendant
has no significant history of prior criminal activity, (b) The capital felony was committed
while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,
(c) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law were substantially impaired, (d) The age
of the defendant at the time of the crime, (e) Any other aspect of the defendant's character
or record or any other circumstances of the offense. Each aggravating circumstance must
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be established beyond a reasonable doubt. If you are reasonably convinced that
mitigating circumstances exist you may consider it as established. Your sentence must be
based on these considerations. Closing arguments are not evidence for your
consideration. In his closing argument, the prosecutor made several statements relating to
the following: his personal discretion in seeking the death penalty; the impact of the loss
of the victim on the family; the relation between deterrence and punishment;
mischaracterizations of your role as jurors, and justification for seeking the death penalty.
He has also made several inflammatory comments designed to elicit sympathy, passion,
or prejudice. Consider the case as though no such statements were made, carefully
considering all of the evidence presented, realizing that a human life is at stake and bring
to bear your best judgment in reaching your sentence.
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Post-Trial Survey Instrument
Thank you again for agreeing to participate in our study. Your responses are important to
our research. Please answer every question on this form. We are interested in your
reactions so please do not alter your answers.
Please circle the number that corresponds with the degree to which you agree or disagree
with the following statements.

Closing arguments are evidence for your consideration.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Completely Disagree

8
Completely Agree

The prosecutor made statements regarding his personal discretion in seeking the death
penalty.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Completely Disagree

8
Completely Agree

The prosecutor made statements regarding the impact of the loss of the victim on the
family.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Completely Disagree

8
Completely Agree

The prosecutor made statements regarding the relation between deterrence and
punishment.
1

2

3

Completely Disagree

4

5

6

7

8
Completely Agree

72

The prosecutor made statements regarding the mischaracterizations of the juror role.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Completely Disagree

8
Completely Agree

The prosecutor made statements regarding the justification for seeking the death penalty.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Completely Disagree

8
Completely Agree

The prosecutor made inflammatory comments designed to elicit sympathy, passion, or
prejudice.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Completely Disagree

8
Completely Agree

The ultimate responsibility for imposing the death penalty on the defendant resides with
the jury.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Completely Disagree

8
Completely Agree

Mitigating circumstances not agreed upon by all jurors should be considered when
providing a sentencing decision.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Completely Disagree

8
Completely Agree

Sentence is determined only by the existence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.
1

2

3

Completely Disagree

4

5

6

7

8
Completely Agree
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Please place a check in the box that corresponds with the appropriate response.
Please indicate the standard of proof you will use in establishing the existence of
aggravating factors.
 Beyond a reasonable doubt

[1]

 Reasonably convincing

[2]

Please indicate the standard of proof you will use in establishing the existence of
mitigating factors.
 Beyond a reasonable doubt

[1]

 Reasonably convincing

[2]

Please rate the extent to which you will consider each of the following factors in your
sentencing decision by circling the number that corresponds to your feelings.
The murdered individual was killed in the course of another felony [kidnapping].
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not consider at all

7

8

Completely consider

The individual was actually killed by the defendant.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not consider at all

7

8

Completely consider

The defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual.
1

2

Not consider at all

3

4

5

6

7

8

Completely consider
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The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not consider at all

7

8

Completely consider

The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not consider at all

7

8

Completely consider

The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law were substantially impaired.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not consider at all

7

8

Completely consider

The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
1

2

Not consider at all

3

4

5

6

7

8

Completely consider

List any other aspect of the defendant's character or record or any other circumstances of
the offense that you will consider when making your sentencing decision:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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Please place a check in the box that corresponds with your response.

Please recommend a sentence for the defendant in this case.
 Life in prison

[1]

 Death by lethal injection

[2]

Please circle the number that corresponds most closely to how you feel.

How confident are you of your sentencing recommendation?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all confident

7

8

Completely confident

How much did you consider aggravating circumstances when making your decision?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not considered at all

7

8

Completely considered

How much did you consider mitigating circumstances when making your decision?
1

2

Not considered at all

3

4

5

6

7

8

Completely considered
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Please rate the extent to which you considered each of the following statements of the
prosecutor’s closing argument in your sentencing decision by circling the number that
corresponds to your feelings.

“If somebody else is thinking about murder, if you punish William Anthony Brooks it’s
supposed to deter others from committing murder.”
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not considered at all

7

8

Completely considered

“I believe in the death penalty. I think it’s necessary.”
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not considered at all

7

8

Completely considered

“Now let’s talk a minute about…Carol Jeannine Galloway. What kind of person was she?
We know that she was a pretty young lady, a beautiful young lady.”

1

2

3

4

5

6

Not considered at all

7

8

Completely considered

“In the seven and a half years I’ve been District Attorney, I believe we’ve only asked for
the death penalty less than a dozen times. I think it’s nearer eight or nine, but I know it’s
less than twelve.”
1

2

Not considered at all

3

4

5

6

7

8

Completely considered
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“William Anthony Brooks…what does he do? He turns around and shoots her down like
you would a dog, a stray dog.”
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not considered at all

7

8

Completely considered

“I’m sure you agree that the evidence in this case against William Brooks is
overwhelming, he did it, there’s no question about it.”
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not considered at all

7

8

Completely considered

“I submit to you that there’s no chance that William Anthony Brooks will ever be
rehabilitated.”
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not considered at all

7

8

Completely considered

“There’ve been children who have been abused and beaten, but they don’t turn to a life of
crime because of it.”
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not considered at all

7

8

Completely considered

“Can I take somebody’s life? Well, the truth of the matter is, you’re not taking his life,
you’re not pulling the switch.”
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not considered at all

7

8

Completely considered

“William Brooks believes in the death penalty, he believes in executing people.”
1

2

Not considered at all

3

4

5

6

7

8

Completely considered
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“Anybody who can kill a poor defenseless person will kill again.”
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not considered at all

7

8

Completely considered

“You don’t dare go out on the streets at night and walk around, you don’t dare leave your
house unlocked. Why? Because of the criminal element in this country. It’s winning.”
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not considered at all

7

8

Completely considered

“Why should the taxpayers have to keep up somebody like William Brooks for the rest of
his life, when he’s done what he’s done?”
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not considered at all

7

8

Completely considered

“I submit to you that William Brooks is a cancer on the body of society, and if we’re
going to save society and save civilization, then we’ve got to remove them from society”’
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not considered at all

7

8

Completely considered

“I believe you’ll vote for the death penalty, I want you to think about this case, and bring
back a verdict that he be put to death.”
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not considered at all

7

8

Completely considered

How seriously did you take your role as a juror in this case?
1

2

Not at all serious

3

4

5

6

7

8

Completely serious
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This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that
word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now. Use the following scale to
record your answers:
1
very slightly
or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

______ cheerful

______ guilty

______ disgusted

______ joyful

______ attentive

______ nervous

______ daring

______ lonely

______ scornful

______ excited

______ irritable

______ hostile

______ delighted

______ proud

______ fearless

______ jittery

______ disgusted with self

______ lively

______ sad

______ ashamed

______ afraid

______ scared

______ shaky

______ angry at self

______ happy

______ enthusiastic

______ alone

______ downhearted

______ alert

______ blameworthy

______ angry

______ determined

______ bold

______ frightened

______ blue

______ loathing

5
extremely
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______ confident
______ energetic
______ concentrating
______ dissatisfied with self
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Debriefing
We appreciate your participation in our study on juror perceptions. The responses you
provided will be used to examine effects of the prosecutor’s statements on sentencing decisions
in capital cases.
If you have any concerns regarding this study, please feel free to contact Jillian Rowback
via e-mail at jrowback950@hawks.rwu.edu or at 716-912-3573 or Dr. Judith Platania in the
Feinstein College of Arts and Sciences Building Office 106, via e-mail at jplatania@rwu.edu or
at 401-254-5738. Thank you for your participation.
*If you are experiencing stress and need assistance, please contact the Roger Williams
University Counseling Center at (401) 254-3124.

